The Struggle between the IDF and the Foreign Ministry for Control over the Armistice Commissions, 1948-1956

Abstract

The armistice agreements signed between Israel and the Arab states at the end of the War of Independence required the establishment of joint commissions to oversee their implementation. Upon their formation, the Foreign Ministry supported placing these commissions under the responsibility and management of the IDF, based on the understanding that the primary issues they would handle would be military in nature. However, the Foreign Ministry soon realized the political nature of the commissions’ activity and the political consequences of their actions and positions. From the Foreign Ministry's perspective, the problem was that military personnel managed the discussions on political issues within the commissions and firmly refused to allow the Foreign Ministry to be involved in their activities or in relations with the UN entities. This was a prolonged, intense, and bitter power struggle between the Foreign Ministry and the IDF over control of the commissions.

In the early years, the Foreign Ministry did not demand control over the commissions but merely sought improved coordination and consideration of its position on various issues. This was met with firm refusal from the IDF, which was supported by Ben-Gurion. Only after Ben-Gurion stepped down as Prime Minister and Moshe Sharett had replaced him did the Foreign Ministry begin to exert pressure, eventually succeeding in early 1955 when Sharett transferred control over the commissions to the Foreign Ministry. Ben-Gurion’s return, first as Minister of Defense and later as Prime Minister, reignited the struggle, as Ben-Gurion contested Sharett’s decision and demanded that responsibility for the commissions be returned to the IDF.