Sino-Israeli Relations in Retrospect

Abstract

Prior to the establishment of their secret relations in the late 1970s, and in the ensuing decades, Israel and the People’s Republic of China have striven to define their interests and policies vis-à-vis each other. These attempts have been influenced by their respective attitudes towards these relations and by mutual misperceptions. Over the years the relations have shifted radically from deep hostility to exceptional amity until, in 2005, the disillusionment regarding the arms transfer led to a crisis whose consequences for Israel remain to be fully understood. 

The article outlines the major developments in Sino-Israeli relations since Israel officially recognized China, in an attempt to outline their typical patterns and motives. To this end, it refers to previous analyses and relies on a variety of Israeli and Chinese sources. The main conclusions are that in light of their relations, China takes into account their consequences on its international position to a much wider extent than does Israel; that Israel does not have – and has never had – leverage over China’s political decision-making; and that Israel should learn how to better handle its relations with both China and the U.S.