A Match that Lit the Six-Day War: The April 7, 1967 Incident

Abstract

The April 7, 1967 incident was the last border operation initiated by Israel in the decade between the 1956 Sinai War and 1967 Six-Day War. In this article, the author describes the tenuous relations between Israel and Syria’s militant Neo- Ba’ath regime with its popular war of independence ideology and the impact of Soviet-American relations on Israeli-Syrian relations. Background to the April 7 incident:

– Soviet support encouraged the Syrians to stay their course and countered Israeli deterrence, while Washington displayed leniency toward Israel’s responses.

– On the one hand, the IDF (Israel Defense Forces) urged Prime Minister Eshkol to face off against Syria and either topple the regime or force it to change its policy; on the other hand, the US and other Western countries were pressing Israel, in camera, to move against Syria, Moscow’s main ally in the region.

– Israel was in the throes of an economic recession and Eshkol’s popularity was waning.

On April 7, Israeli warplanes attacked Syrian outposts. The operation became a symbol of the IDF’s success in its second decade, but strategically the attack was a mistake that brought Israel to the edge of war. Following the incident, Israel’s intelligence directorate wrongly assumed that Egypt and the Soviets would avoid direct involvement as in the past. The government and the army were duly informed, and Israel began threatening Syria directly. Damascus interpreted the beating of war drums as preparation for an offensive to bring down the Ba’ath regime.

Thus, the April 7 incident can be seen as one of factors that ignited the Six-Day War two months later, though this had not been Israel’s intention.