Under the Radar: Constructive Vote of No-Confidence in Israel

Abstract

In 2014, Israel became the seventh country to adopt the rare constructive vote of no confidence mechanism, which limits the ability of the legislative branch to challenge the executive branch. In this article, I deal with the causes and circumstances that led to the adoption of the constructive vote of no-confidence in Israel. By means of historical research that investigates this process from its inception to its conclusion, it is shown that Israel, like other countries, adopted this mechanism with the goal of stabilizing the executive branch, an idea that was proposed by experts and research institutes. With regard to the process itself, it can be seen that catalyzing events advanced the reform by providing its advocates with a window of opportunity they could take advantage of. With respect to the political motives, during the shift to the constructive mechanism it was found that the positions of the parties with regard to the reform were formulated not along ideological lines but rather according to whether they belonged to the coalition or the opposition, since Knesset members are not able to vote according to their personal views. Finally, with regard to the outcome, the paper will claim that the constructive vote of no-confidence mechanism was adopted in Israel under the radar because the issue was not high on the agenda of legislators in the Knesset. The initiators of the reform embedded the proposed change in no-confidence voting within a broader set of reforms. As a result, there were only superficial and non-comprehensive discussions of the proposal. This finding points to a new strategy in the study of parliamentary reforms.